North Korea has become an increasingly demanding mistress for China

(pressian.com)

Despite their espoused alliance, China and North Korea have a long history of issues along their border, including military clashes in 1968 and 1969. Most recently, on January 7, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesman Hong Lei confirmed that in late December 2014 a North Korean solider had fled his post, crossed the border and killed four Chinese citizens while searching for food before he was shot and killed by Chinese police (Xinhua, January 7). This follows a June 2010 incident, in the midst of China’s support for the North after it sunk and killed 46 South Korean soldiers on the Cheonan naval frigate, which the MFA said involved a North Korean border guard killing three Chinese citizens “suspected of engaging in cross-border trading” (China News, June 8, 2010). Both the 2010 and 2015 MFA public statements were in response to South Korean media reports, highlighting the Chinese government’s reluctance to proactively discuss the negative aspects of its relationship with Pyongyang. 

This latest incident touched off a wave of investigative reporting that has so far unearthed at least two largely unknown but similar killings. In December 2013, a “North Korean male” killed a Chinese family and stole 20,000 Renminbi before being arrested by Chinese police (Sohu, January 8). In September 2014, a North Korean civilian killed a family of three and the local Chinese government promptly covered it up (Beijing News, January 6). Sohu reported that killings have been happening since at least 2005—when five North Korean border guards robbed a hotel at gunpoint and killed a Chinese police officer—and that one village right along the border, Nanping, has had over 20 people killed by North Koreans in recent years (Sohu, January 8). Beijing News quoted someone from another village as saying, “they (North Koreans) often come over, wanting money and something to eat… they’re holding a weapon and we don’t dare to not give them something” (Beijing News, January 6). 

Reflecting a seemingly growing frustration, Sohu commented, “For two countries who say they have a friendship and ‘blood alliance,’ but time and again have mishaps, and do not have basic crisis control mechanisms and the common corresponding emergency plans, this is not only very strange, but hard to understand” (Sohu, January 8). The Chinese media has also previously covered Chinese public concerns over the environmental damage caused by North Korea’s nuclear tests and also publicized the three hijackings of Chinese fishing vessels by North Koreans, likely the military, in 2012, 2013 and 2014 (Global Times, February 16, 2013; Beijing News, September 24, 2014).

(Jamestown Foundation)

In an editorial, The Global Times raised the question of why China's state-run news organizations had not reported the incident until Monday, suggesting that relations "too sensitive" between North Korea and China may be behind one of the reasons.

"The relations between China and North Korea should be exercised with common sense in state-to-state relations," the newspaper said.

Unless North Korea adapts to the common sense of relations, the paper said China should "guide" North Korea to adapt to it.

"If you didn't stick to using common sense, social confusion and discord would take place in Chinese society," the paper said.

(Korea Herald)

So, with two years left in the Obama administration, Pyongyang likely has roughly 12 nuclear weapons with an annual manufacturing capacity of possibly four to six bombs. By the time the president leaves office, North Korea may conduct another nuclear test and have an arsenal of 20. Five US administrations determined to prevent North Korea from becoming a nuclear weapon state through various combinations of diplomacy, threats, ultimatums, and sanctions all failed. The George W. Bush administration failed miserably and, to date, the Obama administration has done as badly. 

Why does an expanding North Korean nuclear program matter? The progression from developing the nuclear weapon option, to having a few bombs, to fielding a nuclear arsenal has made Pyongyang increasingly reliant on its nuclear weapons for regime survival and has dimmed the prospect of a denuclearized Korean peninsula. More bombs and better bombs matter—these may instill Pyongyang’s leadership with a false sense of confidence and almost certainly expands what it may think are its tactical and strategic options. The potential for miscalculations and accidents increases, and the consequences will be greater if it has more bombs and more sophisticated bombs with greater reach. In case of turmoil or a chaotic transition in the North, rendering the nuclear weapons and the enterprise safe and secure becomes more difficult. And, a financially desperate leadership may risk the sale of fissile materials or other nuclear assets, perhaps to non-state actors if the state market remains dormant.

(Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists)

When Kim assumed power, he immediately threatened war with the US, posing with his generals beneath a map that showed missiles aimed at North America. Kim ultimately settled for another way to express his leadership: arresting his uncle (and the regime’s China hand) at a party meeting and putting him to death. Whatever their own challenges, China’s leaders know that they cannot rely on the “Young General.” 

China’s motivations in managing North Korea are complex. But, increasingly, the many issues wrapped up in the bilateral relationship are anachronistic. For China, mending relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors, which have been damaged by territorial disputes, is a higher priority. That process is already underway, as China now appears willing to address the disputes multilaterally, through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Similar tensions with Japan have been allowed to fester, benefiting neither side.

(Project Syndicate)

However, it seems from recent developments that China has decided to reach out to North Korea even though North Korea does not look ready to change its course. There are important reasons for this. One, China has been disappointed by South Korean reciprocity, as despite good Chinese posturing, South Korea is still not ready to think beyond its primary ally in the region, the US. Two, US, South Korea and Japan recently signed a trilateral intelligence-sharing agreement related to threats emanating from North Korea. China has criticised this move and considers that the mechanism might be used to share information about China as well. Three, China does not find it appropriate on the part of the international community, especially the US, South Korea and Japan, to become ‘over-proactive’ on the issue of human rights violations in North Korea. Although because of the veto from China and Russia, the matter could not move forward, it was definitely a coordinated move to declare North Korean human rights violations ‘crime against humanity’ and refer it to the International Criminal Court (ICC). China worries that such precedents would be bad for Beijing. Four, North Korea over the past year had been moving closer to Russia. In December 2014, No Kwang-chol, vice chief of the General Staff of the North’s Army met his Russian counterpart, and Choe Ryong-hae, the Workers’ Party of Korea secretary met Russian Foreign Minster and pledged to improve bilateral defence and economic relations. Furthermore, Russian President Vladimir Putin has invited North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to Moscow in 2015.

(Eurasia Review)