Nanhai Waiwai - Policy Continuity, Hybrid War & Winning #SouthChinaSea

From The Diplomat, some insights on policy continuity:

The level of tension President Barack Obama’s successor inherits next January, however, hinges in no small measure on what transpires in the weeks and months ahead.  With the coming judgment of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in the case that has been dubbed Philippines v. China, President Xi Jinping may prefer to test the will of a distracted lame-duck U.S. leader now, rather than wait for a new one who may have to demonstrate his or her resolve from the outset. As China has so far been successful at pushing a de facto context further in its favor, Beijing is likely to try to have the new U.S. president face a fait accompli in the South China Sea. 

Perhaps in light of this, the United States is continuing its policy of leaning far forward to reassure friends in the region that Washington is determined to curb China’s excessive claims without precipitating conflict. Accordingly, the Defense Department is investing additional resources in the domain awareness and minimal defensive capabilities of key regional states, and top-level leadership has increased its exchanges with regional powers. 

The South China Sea has become a litmus test for the Obama administration’s strategy of rebalancing to Asia. Hence, what the United States does or does not do in the waters and corridors of power around Southeast Asia in the coming weeks and months will set the standard by which U.S. credibility and regional policy will be judged during the next administration.

http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/how-the-next-us-president-should-handle-the-south-china-sea/


More from The Diplomat and the FT, on China's diplomatic pressure at ASEAN and elsewhere:

Just one day before the Lao president’s visit to Vietnam, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said in a remarkable statement that China had reached a four-point consensus with Cambodia, Brunei, and Laos about resolving the South China Sea disputes. Namely, those countries agreed that ASEAN claimant states should negotiate disputes with Beijing directly, not through the group. That means the South China Sea disputes should not cause any problems between China and the ASEAN group, according to Wang.

For Vietnam, government and public opinion alike, it was jarring to see Laos take this position on the South China Sea, particularly as the country and Vietnam are often described as “brothers.” Even more importantly, Laos is the rotating chair of ASEAN this year, meaning its decision on every issue can have a significant influence on the region.

http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/vietnam-fears-isolation-on-south-china-sea-issue/

The unfolding public relations battle over the Philippines arbitration case shows that policymakers in Beijing are worried China will look like a rogue international rule-breaker because of its defiance of The Hague tribunal.

https://next.ft.com/content/bd57f528-0e27-11e6-b41f-0beb7e589515

(And from last week: http://b-copysf.blogspot.com/2016/04/southchinasea-prc-pressure-on-asean.html)



Reuters with more on PRC's Hybrid "Militiafishermen" force:

The city-level branches of the People's Armed Forces Department provide basic military training to fishermen, said the Hainan government advisor. The branches are overseen by both the military and local Communist Party authorities in charge of militia operations nationwide.  

The training encompasses search and rescue operations, contending with disasters at sea, and "safeguarding Chinese sovereignty", said the advisor who focuses on the South China Sea.

The training, which includes exercises at sea, takes place between May and August and the government pays fishermen for participating, he said.
Government subsidies encourage fishermen to use heavier vessels with steel - as opposed to wooden - hulls.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/-China-trains-fishing-militia-to-sail-into-disputed-waters/articleshow/52073684.cms

And a positive takeaway from War On The Rocks: US Scores a Low-Profile Win

If this narrative is accurate, then we have a logical explanation for why the United States would send A-10s to Scarborough and a carrier strike group to the South China Sea while cancelling a FONOP. After all, while U.S. freedom of navigation operations are important signals for general deterrence, they have not deterred China from specific reclamation activities. Moreover, the most likely FONOP, one near Mischief Reef, would probably involve the conduct of normal military operations within 12 nautical miles of the reef, which could have triggered a major public reaction from Beijing. On the other hand, deploying multiple U.S. combat aircraft to a disputed feature is a highly unusual move, and the choice of the durable A-10 could signal the United States was prepared to take a hit. 

Despite these strong U.S. moves, the A-10 flights near Scarborough Shoal were conducted with remarkably little publicity, particularly compared to the numerous leaks that preceded recent FONOPs. Avoiding a public spat with Beijing may have been important to give China an off-ramp to forgo reclamation at Scarborough. The Mischief Reef FONOP can always be conducted at another time once tensions have subsided. In the same vein, the so-called “gag order” on the military may have simply been an internal agreement to avoid public disclosure of this plan to maximize Beijing’s “political maneuvering space.”

http://warontherocks.com/2016/05/successful-signaling-at-scarborough-shoal/