The Coast Guard led Japan’s response to the recent incident, and it will continue to play this role in similar situations going forward. But the time has come to begin exploring a new paradigm for marshaling Japan’s combined maritime capability.
I am not suggesting, as some have recently, that Japan should consider mobilizing its Maritime Self-Defense Force for such contingencies, taking advantage of provisions of the Self-Defense Forces Act that permit the prime minister to authorize the deployment of the SDF when there is a special need to protect Japanese life or property or to maintain law and order. Rather, I propose a permanent joint program that integrates the capabilities of our maritime law enforcement and security forces.
A good example of such a program elsewhere is the US effort targeting illicit drug trafficking in coastal waters along the Central American isthmus. The US Naval Forces Southern Command/US 4th Fleet participates in this mission in addition to conventional security operations. Although the mission is technically law enforcement, which differs from the use of military force, the US 4th Fleet is permitted to deploy destroyers and aircraft to supplement the resources of the US Coast Guard, which are insufficient for the task. Both participate in the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF), a multiagency program targeting aerial and maritime traffic attempting to bring drugs into the United States.
Given the prevalence of anti-American sentiment in Central America, there initially was concern within the United States that joint counterdrug operations by US Coast Guard patrols and naval vessels and aircraft in the region would draw an uneasy response, but today the JIATF is highly regarded for its track record in interdicting drug traffickers.
A comparable program conducted jointly by the Japan Coast Guard and the Maritime Self-Defense Force as part of their permanent mission would be an effective way of beefing up Japan’s warning and surveillance of foreign vessels operating in our vast EEZ. (The Senkakus would be excluded due to overt tensions existing in waters around the islands from the presence of both Japanese and Chinese Coast Guard vessels. The exceedingly sensitive nature of this situation makes the deployment of the JMSDF, even for enforcing maritime law, impossible.) It would contribute greatly to the policing of the EEZ at a time when the Japan Coast Guard is stretched thin owing to the necessity of concentrating its patrol vessels and aircraft around the Senkaku Islands. This would constitute an important contribution to the preservation of the international maritime order.
Like the Japan Self-Defense Forces, the US military must abide by strict constraints on its involvement in nonmilitary missions. Nonetheless, the JIATF is sanctioned as a legitimate exception to these constraints, and today the activities of the 4th Fleet in the waters off Central America are viewed as a crucial component of the US counterdrug program in the region. The time has come for Japan to follow suit and consider a new paradigm that makes integrated use of our full range of maritime capabilities for a more flexible response. Needless to say, such a shift will be impossible without substantial legal changes and other institutional measures.
(nippon.com)
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