38 North on DPRK's limitations in any nuclear war:
More than a decade of punishing sanctions have thus far not had the desired effect on North Korean behavior and the new ones implemented in accordance with UNSCR Resolution 2270 are unlikely to be more effective. Kim Jong Un’s regime, like its predecessor, sees nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of state survival. Taken from the perspective of a dictator, it isn’t difficult to imagine the Kim regime looking to the fate of toppled Libyan strongman Muammar Gaddafi, who cooperated with the United States on the surrender of his own WMD stockpiles yet was deposed and ultimately killed by opposition rebels backed by Washington in 2011, and opting for another course.[3]
This is just one example that helps explain the North Korean calculus. Since the imposition of the new Security Council sanctions and amid the near global condemnation that has followed its latest round of nuclear testing, Pyongyang has issued a steady stream of increasingly volatile and threatening statements, including a threat to launch nuclear strikes at New York.[4] After the additional sanctions were levied, the DPRK publicized that Kim had given the order for the nation’s nuclear forces to be put on high alert.[5] While such language is often treated as something of a joke among western audiences, talk of the sort emanating out of Pyongyang may signify that the DPRK leadership views its nuclear weapons as “inherently usable.”[6] At the Workers’ Party of Korea’s 7th Congress last month, Kim shed greater light on what sort of scenario could trigger a DPRK nuclear strike. He stated that North Korean sovereignty would have to be threatened by “invasive hostile forces with nuclear weapons.” Given the regime’s behavior, however, this should hardly be taken as gospel. Just what exactly would constitute a violation of DPRK sovereignty is unclear, as is how Pyongyang might classify the terms “hostile” and “invasive.”
In a sense, this is reminiscent of Russia’s “escalate to deescalate” concept – the nuclear posture Moscow adopted in the wake of NATO’s 1999 intervention in Yugoslavia. The doctrine essentially revolves around the premise that Russia reserves the option to execute a first-strike nuclear attack in a limited fashion against an opponent that has overwhelmed its conventional capacities, but it does not specify the kind of live setting that would fall within the doctrine’s framework. Unlike Russia, however, the North Korean nuclear posture is not particularly diversified. Asymmetric escalation options for the DPRK leadership are somewhat limited; North Korea has not concentrated on advanced tactical nuclear weapons and that in turn limits how it might actually fight a nuclear war.http://38north.org/2016/06/gmclennan061316/
Straits Times on the necessity of breaking the ASEAN/China impasse over the South China Sea:
Asean's achievement culminated with the Asean Community, launched with fanfare in 2008 and now, in effect, comprising three pillars known as the Asean Political-Security Community (APSC), Asean Economic Community (AEC) and Asean Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC).
Many have mocked these Asean-related acronyms and abbreviations as endless, empty talk shops along with hundreds of accompanying meetings. But they have enabled South-east Asia's economic growth and development and kept the region devoid of destructive war and conflict, as was the case in the distant past. Asean's constellation of regional vehicles also has provided an anchor for the wider peace in East Asia.
What China is doing to Asean in the South China Sea, and what the Philippines is doing to China at the UN and with the US and other major powers, is counterproductive and corrosive to how much Asean has achieved for South-east Asia's peace, stability and prosperity.
How things worked in Asean's past will no longer work in its future. An Asean-China accommodation is imperative.http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/aseans-disunity-undermines-its-centrality
Eurasianet on Central Asia's apprehensions toward Chinese power:
The narrative of spreading Chinese influence throughout the region is not new. Indicators of China’s influence are plentiful. Markets are full of Chinese products, infrastructure is heavily built by Chinese firms with Chinese loans, leadership visits — either Chinese to the region or regional to China — are followed by announcements of massive deals being signed, and increasingly China is playing a more prominent role in regional security questions. Even so, China remains a hesitant regional actor, and is keen to continue casting itself as subordinate to Russia. ... Most recently, these complications have manifested themselves as protests in Kazakhstan, where locals have expressed anger at the government’s decision to change legislation governing foreigners’ ability to rent land for lengthy periods of time. Public anger is rooted mostly in concerns that Chinese firms will exploit this legislation to slowly lease ever larger tracts of Kazakhstani land. Such problems have arisen in the past... In other contexts, China finds itself embroiled in corruption scandals... (and) continues to be concerned about security threats connected to the region. Lower level criminality affects Chinese entrepreneurs in the region who are sometimes seen as a soft touch by local criminals, while the government continues to express concern about terrorist groups and networks that are believed to be active in the region. On more strategic level, a major challenge for Chinese officials is related to perception. There is a persistent sense among experts and officials in Central Asia that China’s interests and investment in the region mask some sort of hidden agenda. Such wariness is often exacerbated by a belief that China is only interested in the region’s natural resources, or sees Central Asia merely as a conduit to more lucrative markets elsewhere.http://www.eurasianet.org/node/79306
SCMP on the apparent growth of Crony Capaitalism in Hong Kong:
... there are economic, political and social factors behind Hong Kong’s high placement in the (rent-seeking) index today.
First, the industrial composition of the economy has changed since 1980 from manufacturing to services, which are far more likely to be regulated... Industries where government regulations are important have expanded relative to the economy, especially finance, development, and transportation. This structural transformation of the economy has predisposed it towards more rent seeking.
Second, political reforms, both before and after 1997, have empowered new groups and constituencies. The introduction of elected representatives to the Legislative Council and District Councils has lowered the organisation cost for businesses, professionals, and other interest groups and political parties to become more effective at rent seeking.
This has also opened up new avenues and created new opportunities for rent seeking through government regulation – for example, minimum wage legislation, the mandatory provident fund and compulsory building maintenance requirements.
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